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RECENT DECISIONS 
AnMIRALTY-JURISDICTION-AcnoN FOR: WRONGFUL DEATii ON THE HIGH 
SEAS LIMITED TO ADMIRALTY-Plaintiff as widow and administratrix seeks 
dam.ages from the United States for the alleged wrongful death of her hus-
band on the high seas. Action was brought at law under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.1 Government's motion to dismiss was sustained. There is no 
common law cause of action for wrongful death on the high seas. The 
federal Death on the High Seas Act2 gives a remedy to the representative 
only "in Admiralty," and thus jurisdiction is lacking at law in the district 
court. Kunkel v. United States, (S.D. Cal. 1956) 140 F. Supp. 591. 
Maritime jurisdiction, given to the Federal Government by the Consti-
tution,s has, since the first Judiciary Act of 1789, been shared with state 
courts.4 The current act provides that "the district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: any civil case of ad-
miralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."5 The effect of the saving-to-
suitors clause has been to provide a choice of tribunals for plaintiffs bring-
ing suits under maritime law. An action may be brought in admiralty court 
or, if only a common law damage remedy is sought, the action may be heard 
in a state or federal court with a jury. Contrary to the interpretation of 
the principal case, the clause has not ordinarily been held to save to suitors 
only common law causes of action. The admiralty courts do have exclusive 
jurisdiction for a libel in rem (an action against the vessel), as this was not 
a common law remedy;6 but personal actions-even those based on a sub-
stantive maritime right-may be heard in any court where jurisdiction is 
obtained over the person.7 For example, such common law maritime rights 
as maintenance and cure8 (a duty on the master to provide for the mainte-
nance and cure of seamen who fall sick or are injured in the service of the 
ship) and unseaworthiness9 (an implied warranty to seamen that ship and 
equipment are free from defect) may be brought as personal actions at law 
in state courts or federal courts as well as in admiralty. These actions were 
traditionally brought in admiralty courts, yet the saving-to-suitors clause 
afforded an opportunity to use a common law dam.age remedy in any court 
128 U.S.C. (1952) §§2671 to 2680. 
2 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§761 to 768. 
3 U.S. CoNsr., art. III, §2. 
4 l Stat. 76 (1789). 
IS 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1333 (1). 
6 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 411 (1866). 
'1 See, 1 BENEDicr, ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., 35 (1940), and ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 22 (1939), 
for discussions on the choice of remedies in maritime law. 
SLeon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 185 (1870); Cuccia v. United States Shipping 
Board, (N.Y. 1928) 1928 A.M.C. 435; Compton v. Hammond Lumber, (Ore. 1936) 1936 
A.M.C. 552, revd. 1936 A.M.C. 844. 
9 Larson v. Alaska Shipping Co., 96 Wash. 665, 165 P. 880 (1917). See The Osceola, 
189 U.S. 158 (1903), for discussion of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and a 
general history of maritime law. 
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having jurisdiction over the parties. The Seamen's Act of 192010 added to 
the substantive maritime law by giving seamen various new rights. For the 
first time seamen were given an action for injury due to negligence, and 
their representatives were given an action for wrongful death. According 
to the statute, these new rights could be enforced by personal actions at law 
in state and federal courts, but the Supreme Court in a situation analogous 
to that of the principal case held that admiralty jurisdiction is open to the 
adjudication of all maritime cases as a matter of course according to the 
Constitution. The Court also held that a resort to common law remedies 
is a matter of grace stemming from the judiciary acts and the pattern of 
maritime jurisdiction which has grown up in this country.11 The federal 
Death on the High Seas Act (DHSA) provides that "whenever the death of 
a person shall be caused by wrongful act . . . on the high seas . . . the 
personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in 
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty ... against the vessel, 
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not en-
sued."12 The principal case interprets the clause "may maintain a suit ... 
in admiralty" as limiting the remedy for a wrongful death action exclu-
sively to admiralty courts.13 State and federal courts have split on this in-
terpretation. The contrary view is that Congress provided a right of action 
which may be enforced in any court, and in addition, the wrongful death 
action may be enforced in admiralty with all admiralty remedies including 
a libel in rem.14 The Seamen's Act was passed a few months prior to the 
DHSA. Nothing appears in the language of the DHSA, the committee re-
ports, or the Congressional Record to indicate that Congress intended the 
remedies of the two acts to vary.15 Thus a seamen has a complete choice of 
10 41 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688 (often referred to as the Seamen's Act 
of 1920 or the Jones Act). 
11 Panama Ry. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 at 390 (1924). State courts were held to 
have jurisdict_ion also in Panama Ry. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 at 560 (1926). "This 
clause • • • [the saving to suitors clause] •.• has always been construed as permitting 
substantive rights under the maritime law . . . to be asserted and enforced in actions 
in personam according to the course of common law .•. [a]nd it uniformly has been 
regarded as permitting such action to be brought in either the federal courts or the 
state courts, as the possessor of the right may elect." 
12 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §761. 
13 Accord: Higa v. Transocean Airlines, (9th Cir. 1955) 230 F. (2d) 780; Wilson v. 
Transocean Airlines, (N.D. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 85; Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 619; Birks v. United Fruit, (S.D. N.Y. 
1930) 48 F. (2d) 656; Egan v. Donaldson Atlantic Lines, (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 
909; Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Navigation, (E.D. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 
677; Dall v. Cosulich Societa Triestina Di Navigazione, (S.D. N.Y. 1928) 1936 A.M.C. 359. 
14 Sierra v. Pan American World Airways, (D.C. Puerto Rico 1952) 107 F. Supp. 
519; Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E. (2d) 533 (1946); Wyman v. 
Pan American Airways, 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 420 (1943), affd. 293 N.Y. 878, 
59 N.E. (2d) 785 (1944), cert. den. 324 U.S. 882 (1945); Batkiewicz v. Seas Shipping, 
(S.D. N.Y. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 802; Choy v. Pan American Airways, (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 1941 
A.M.C. 483; Elliott v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 9 (1938); The 
Saturnia, (S.D. N.Y. 1936) 1936 A.M.C. 469. 
15 59 CONG. REc. 4482 (1920); s. Rep. 216, 66th Cong., (1920); H. Rep. 264, 66th 
Cong. (1920). 
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forums in which to bring an action for an injury to himself, as does his rep-
resentative in bringing an action for the seaman's wrongful death. Under 
the saving-to-suitors clause, a passenger who is injured on the high seas has 
a similar choice,16 but if he dies, the principal case would restrict his repre-
sentative to a remedy only in admiralty. The pattern of maritime jurisdic-
tion has been to provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to enforce maritime 
rights by common law damage remedies in law courts where a jury is avail-
able, as well as in admiralty courts. If Congress had desired to change this 
pattern in the DHSA, definite language would have been used. A court 
should not give this section of the statute a meaning inconsistent with the 
over-all legislative pattern. There is no apparent reason why seamen and 
passengers should be treated differently when personal representatives sue 
for their wrongful death. The clause saving to suitors the right to a remedy 
at law has been liberally interpreted in all prior instances, and no special 
reasons appear for the restrictions imposed on it by the principal case. 
Robert Knauss, S.Ed. 
16 Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 12 Otto. (102 U.S.) 118 (1880); Jansson v. Swedish 
American Line, (1st Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 212. 
